Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0

Author-Name: Florencia M. Gabrielli
Author-Workplace-Name: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo - CONICET


Title: Detecting Collusion on Highway Procurement


Abstract: This paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement. The main objective is twofold. First, to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach, and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in California. I identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members. Relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric, I find evidence supporting the collusive scheme, for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion.




Classification-JEL: C14, C72, D44.

Keywords: Auctions, Cartel, Structural Approach, Collusion, Competition.

Journal: Económica

Pages: 127-165
Volume: 59
Year: 2013
Month: January-December
File-URL: https://revistas.unlp.edu.ar/Economica/article/view/5355/4384
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:akh:journl:588