Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0

Author-Name: Darío Alejandro Rossignolo
Author-Workplace-Name: UBA

Title: La competencia tributaria vertical y el tamaño del sector público.

Abstract: This paper presents a model in which vertical tax externalities emerge when considering taxes on consumption, in countries with a federal government level and states that impose taxes on the same tax base. It is shown that levels of public expenditure and tax rates depend crucially on two factors. First, they depend on the way each government level consider the budget constraint of the other level when varying its tax rates (vertical externality), and secondly, on the quantity of existing subnational governments.

Classification-JEL: H2; H5; H7
 
Keywords: taxes, externalities, government levels, tax competition.
Journal: Económica

Pages: 72-134
Volume: 63
Year: 2017
Month: January-December
File-URL: https://revistas.unlp.edu.ar/Economica/article/view/5075/4245
File-Format: Application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:akh:journl:609